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Rage against 
the machines
New technology and violent 
unrest in industrializing England
Bruno Caprettini Post-doctoral SNSF Ambizione Fellow, University of Zurich
Joachim Voth Professor of Macroeconomics and Financial Markets, University of Zurich
The history of economic growth over the 
last 250 years is also the history of job 
destruction. Since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, new machinery has wiped  
out countless jobs and replaced millions of 
workers.
Mechanization has also transformed the 
economy – since the 1800s, it turned 
agriculture from the main source of employ-
ment into a marginal sector (Crafts, 1985). 
More recently, job losses have spread to 
manufacturing and service jobs: computers 
today perform many routine tasks that 
used to give work to thousands of people, 
from telephone operators to secretaries.
The seeds of destruction 
The idea that capitalism holds the seeds of 
its own destruction is as old as the Indus-
trial Revolution. David Ricardo, writing in 
1821, added a whole chapter to his book 
Rage against the machines 
In a nutshell 
Under what circumstances might the adoption of labor-saving 
technology lead to extreme social instability? This policy brief 
examines the case of the Captain Swing riots in the industrializing 
England of the 1830s, bringing new insights to this old episode by 
collecting original data on the diffusion of the threshing machine, 
an innovation that led to severe labor unrest in wheat-growing parts 
of the country. The evidence illustrates that while new technologies 
typically boost output overall, not everyone benefits – and the 
losers may not always suffer in silence. Societies need to find ways 
to cushion the blow of technological unemployment, perhaps by 
offering alternative work or providing minimum income guarantees.
Opportunities for action
1
New technologies may affect 
the distribution of output 
among the factors of produc-
tion. They also increase overall 
production, so in theory every-
one can gain. But this is not 
automatic, and labor-saving 
technologies will leave workers 
worse off if left unchecked.
In detail
3
Outside options also matter 
in terms of opportunities for 
alternative employment. When 
workers can easily find work 
elsewhere, they may more 
readily accept the introduction 
of new technologies.
2
For societies to adopt 
technology more effectively, 
they need ways to cushion the 
potential blow. Institutions of 
the welfare state may con-
tribute to preventing unrest, 
just as in 1830s England, the 
embryonic provision for the 
disadvantaged helped to keep 
the social peace.
2
on political economy, arguing that ‘the 
substitution of machinery for human labor, 
is often very injurious to the interests of 
the class of laborers.’ The idea that rapid 
technological change would immiserize  
the working class and ultimately lead to 
social instability was also at the core of 
Karl Marx's predictions.
More recently, Nobel laureate Wassily 
Leontief (1983) said that the ‘specter of 
technological unemployment that provoked 
Lancashire weavers into a revolt 170 years 
ago, but that receded after the demand for 
skilled workers needed to operate complex 
(but dumb) machines replaced the demand 
for unskilled physical labor, is here again. 
But there are good reasons to believe that 
this time it will not retreat’.
But until recently, textbook treatments of 
‘technological unemployment’ generally 
downplayed the possibility of significant 
social and economic disruption (Summers, 
2013). While there is growing evidence 
that the replacement of humans with 
machines for routine tasks can lead to dis-
location in the labor market (Autor et al, 
2003), empirical support for the idea that 
technology-induced unemployment creates 
social unrest is conspicuously absent.
Even classic historical examples of 
technology-induced unrest, such as the 
famous Luddite attacks on industrial 
machines and the Captain Swing riots in 
industrializing England, have been called 
into question. Joel Mokyr and colleagues 
(2015), for example, suggest that in the 
‘Luddite (1811-16) and Captain Swing 
(1830-32) riots, the role actually played 
by the concerns of laborers about being 
replaced by machinery has been greatly 
exaggerated.’
But if the new machines were not the 
cause of protest in the case of the Swing 
riots, why did workers put them at the 
center of their protests? Why did the Swing 
rioters ask their masters to destroy the new 
threshing machines themselves – and  
why did they proceed to break these 
machines and set them on fire when the 
masters refused to do it?
While previous research has proposed 
alternative explanations for the outbreak 
of the Swing riots – emphasizing an influx 
of Irish laborers, spillovers from the 1830 
revolution in Paris and discontent about 
the administration of the Poor Law – we 
believe that the role of new technologies 
should be returned to center stage.
Our study collects new evidence on the 
spread of labor-saving technology in 
industrializing England. We show that it 
is associated with unrest on a substantial 
scale, and we demonstrate that there is 
indeed a causal connection between the 
introduction of the new machines and 
social unrest during the Swing riots.
The Captain Swing riots
Between the summer of 1830 and the 
summer of 1832, riots swept through the 
English countryside. Over no more than 
two years, 3,000 riots broke out – by 
far the largest case of popular unrest in 
England since 1700. During the riots, rural 
laborers burned down farmhouses, expelled 
overseers of the poor and sent threatening 
letters to landlords and farmers signed by 
the mythical character known as Captain 
Swing. Most of all, workers attacked and 
destroyed threshing machines.
Threshing machines were used to thresh 
grain, especially wheat. Until the end of the 
1700s, threshing grain was done manually 
and it was the principal form of employ-
ment in the countryside during the winter 
months. Starting from the Napoleonic 
Wars (1803-1815), threshing machines 
spread across England, replacing workers. 
Horse-driven or water-powered threshers 
could finish in a matter of weeks a task 
that would have normally kept workers 
busy for months. Their use arguably 
depressed the wages of rural workers. 
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Eventually, in the summer of 1830,  
rural workers revolted in the Swing riots.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the riots, 
using data from Holland (2005). While 
almost the entire country saw some kind  
of unrest, riots were concentrated in the 
South and South East of England, as well 
as in East Anglia. Moreover, even within 
regions, we observe wide variation in the 
incidence of riots, with areas with and 
without incidents located immediately 
adjacent to one another.
Measuring the spread of 
a new technology
To see if the adoption of labor-saving tech-
nology played an important role in fanning 
the flames of discontent, we collect new 
data on the adoption of threshing machines 
by examining farm advertisements in local 
English newspapers. Whenever a farm 
was for sale or its lease came up, such ads 
would list in great detail all the relevant 
characteristics of the property, from the 
size of the plot to the farmhouse and any 
machinery that went with it – including 
threshing machines.
We analyze data from 60 newspapers  
over the period from 1800 to 1830: a total 
of 118,758 articles of all kinds. Among 
these, we find 549 ads in 466 parishes 
that mentioned the presence of a threshing 
machine. Especially in the years after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, the number of 
ads mentioning threshing machines surged. 
Figure 2 plots the location and intensity  
of threshing machine uptake, as document-
ed in ads.
The impact on unrest
A very simple statistic shows the change 
in the frequency of riots. In places where 
no ads for farms with threshing machines 
were published, the probability of a 
riot was 14%; in places with threshing 
machines, it was 26% or almost two times 
higher. When we focus on attacks on 
threshing machines or other agricultural 
capital equipment, the averages are lower 
but the relative difference is greater: 3% to 
6.4%.
This suggests a large effect of new tech-
nology adoption on social instability. The 
places that saw the highest probability of 
unrest were also the ones with the highest 
adoption rates of threshing machines.
Places in England with the high-
est adoption rates of threshing 
machines had the highest proba-
bility of social instability
But this relationship need not be causal. 
For example, it could be that areas with 
more newspapers carried more ads for 
threshing machines, and also had better 
coverage of riots.
We rule out this possibility by showing 
that while riot probabilities seem to decline 
with distance from the place of publication 
of a newspaper, the same is not true for 
ads – proximity to a newspaper location 
is not a good predictor of coverage by 
farm ads. And looking only at places no 
further than 50km from the nearest town 
with a newspaper, we find exactly the same 
effects.
 
Why technology adoption varied
A crucial question is why some places 
adopted the new technology before others. 
If take-up were driven by factors that could 
also directly influence unrest, we would 
not identify a clean effect of labor-saving 
machines on unrest. The estimates may 
also be biased downwards if landlords 
feared unrest, and consequently introduced 
fewer machines. To pin down causality  
and gauge magnitudes correctly, we look at 
the geographical location of parishes and 
the nature of their soil. 
In particular, we look at two factors that 
made the adoption of the new technology 
more likely:
4
Empirical evidence
Figure 1: 
Location of Swing riots
Figure 2: 
Location of threshing machines
1 Machine
5 Machines
e.g. Ely (Cambridgeshire)
Newspaper ads
1 Riot
26 Riots
e.g. Whitchurch 
(Shropshire)
Brighton
Brighton
Reading
Reading
London
London
Nottingham
Nottingham
Ely 
Newcastle 
upon Tyne
Newcastle 
upon Tyne
Bristol
Bristol
Oxford
Oxford
Liverpool
Liverpool
Whitchurch
Notes: Location of Swing riots. Purple circles identify parishes with Swing riots; the size of the circles is 
proportional to the number of episodes recorded in each parish.
Notes: Location of threshing machines. Orange circles identify parishes with threshing machines; the 
size of the circles is proportional to the number of machines we found. Blue dots show cities that published 
newspaper advertisements at the time.
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Figure 3: 
Geographical characteristics 
and location of the riots
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Notes: Illustration of research design. The map shows the potential yield of wheat and the location of the 
Swing riots (as purple circles). The panels drawn on the map are reproduced in the three panels below, where 
they show riot locations (as white circles) and our measure of river presence: the log accumulation flow.
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• The suitability of a region for wheat 
cultivation.
• The availability of sufficient water power. 
For technological reasons, early threshing 
machines were only useful for threshing 
wheat; other grains, such as rye and barley, 
could not be threshed economically by early 
machines (Hobsbawm and Rudé, 2014). 
We examine soil suitability for wheat,  
as established by the Food Administration 
Organization (FAO). The FAO classifies 
all the world's land by suitability for 
various crops. We use modern-day data on 
England's soil to see how suitable different 
parishes were for the cultivation of wheat.
When we compare the maps of technology 
adoption with FAO wheat suitability data, 
we notice a great degree of overlap. Where 
the land is good for wheat, according to the 
FAO, farmers bought a lot more threshing 
machines. Importantly, the part of the 
variation driven by soil characteristics also 
predicts unrest: this is apparent on the map 
of England in Figure 3, where the areas  
that are more suitable for wheat (in green) 
are also those that experienced more unrest.
The use of new machines to 
save labor in threshing wheat 
led directly to more riots
Not all wheat-producing areas were 
equally likely to adopt the new machines. 
Where water power was available in 
abundance, the new technology was more 
attractive. Based on geological data on the 
volume and direction of water flowing in a 
parish, we create an index of suitability for 
the use of water power: the accumulation 
flow. In combination, wheat suitability and 
accumulation flow are strong predictors of 
the adoption of threshing machines.
Moreover, we also show that the higher the 
suitability for wheat, and the more water is 
available for driving machinery, the greater 
the level of unrest. The three panels in the 
lower half of Figure 3 visualize the rela-
tionship between riots and the availability 
of water power in three separate regions of 
England. They reveal that within relatively 
homogeneous agricultural areas, riots were 
more common where more water flowed. 
This makes it more likely that machine 
adoption actually caused political unrest.
Unrest in 1830 also had negative long-term 
effects. Where unrest broke out, farmers 
subsequently avoided installing new ma-
chines – and not just threshing machines. 
In addition, inventive activity went down. 
Looking at patent data, we find that the 
further a parish was from violent riots and 
unrest in 1830, the higher the patenting 
rate – a pattern that was not visible in the 
data prior to 1830. 
 
What could have been done 
to avoid the unrest? 
Outside options mattered. Where workers 
could easily work elsewhere because their 
agricultural parish was relatively close  
to a large, thriving urban labor market, the 
new machines did not spell trouble.  
In contrast, the more remote a parish and  
the less vibrant the next market town,  
the higher the risk of instability.
We also find some suggestive evidence that 
England's embryonic welfare state helped 
to keep the social peace. Under the Poor 
Law, support for poor people varied at  
the local level. The more generous a parish 
was, the lower the correlation between 
threshing machines and unrest.
Conclusions
Over the last 200 years, new machines 
have increasingly replaced humans, and 
output per capita has surged more than 
ten-fold in most industrialized countries. 
At the same time, working hours have  
decreased from around 3,500 hours  
per year to around 2,000 for full-time  
employees, and an ever-smaller part of 
human life is spent working (Voth, 2001).
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While the enormous increase in output per 
head as a result of technological change has 
contributed to rising living standards, it  
has also led to sharp declines in demand for 
less skilled labor. Our research examines 
the extent to which the replacement of 
workers by technology in this way can lead 
to ‘rage against the machines’.
The results suggest that in one of the most 
dramatic cases of labor unrest in recent 
history, labor-saving technology played 
a key role. While the past may not be 
an accurate guide to future upheavals, 
evidence from the days of Captain Swing 
serve as a reminder of how disruptive 
new, labor-saving technologies can be in 
economic, social and political terms.
The Captain Swing riots of the 
1830s are a reminder of the 
potential of new technologies to 
cause economic, social and 
political disruption
If technology-induced job losses are rapid 
and affect a large part of the workforce, the 
risk of unrest can quickly become serious. 
New technologies may increase output 
overall, but the gains are not necessarily 
distributed equally – and the losers do not 
always suffer in silence.
For societies to adopt technology more 
effectively, enhancing productivity and 
wealth overall, they need ways to cushion 
the blow. This might be done either by 
offering alternative employment in thriving 
sectors or by providing minimum income 
guarantees.
This UBS Center Policy Brief summarizes ‘Rage Against the Machines: 
Labor-Saving Technology and Unrest in England, 1830-32’ by Bruno 
Caprettini and Joachim Voth.
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